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In this paper we elaborate, supported by literature on trust, a framework for corporate governance 
that might overcome lacunas in the classical frameworks of the principal agency theory and the 
stewardship theory. A historical analysis of the development of corporate governance in the 
context of the Dutch semi-public housing management shows that a mixture of principal agency 
and stewardship approach of semi-public managers proves to be contradictory and toxic. A 
discourse analysis and factor analysis report on the search of actors for a more effective corporate 
governance. The findings are only indicative, due to the explorative stage of the research. The 
indication is that third framework gets more positive and consistent support in the corporate 
governance practice. A longitudinal set up and extension of samples and contexts is 
recommended. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
1.1. Theoretical frameworks for corporate 
governance 
 
The governance of corporations is subject to debate 
since Berle and Means (1932) wrote their seminal 
article on the separation of ownership and control. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed the principal 
agency approach as a solution to the governance 
problems raised by Berle and Means. In this solution 
there is a board - called the principal - which on behalf 
of the shareholders/owners hires and fires the senior 
management, designs a set of incentives, and 
monitors the outcome of the decisions made by the 
management. In this approach the economic logic of 
decision-making, guided by self-interest is retained. 
In the governance design, incentives and monitoring 
are aligning the interests of senior managers with 
those of the firm. The reliance on self-interest and 
extrinsic motivation evoked fierce critique (for 
instance Ghoshal, 2005) and initiated an antagonist 
approach, namely the stewardship theory (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997), 
in which the intrinsic motivation of the management 
warrants task execution aligned with the interests of 
the corporation. In this approach it is assumed that 
autonomy is favorable to both the steward and the 
outcome of decisions made. Although associated with 
stewardship, the managerial autonomy also has a 
function in the principal agency approach. Limited in 
information on market opportunities and 
(innovational) potentials of the corporation, the 
senior management is allowed and even induced by 
incentives to take the role of entrepreneur and 
overcome risk aversion (Haid, 1997).  
The two approaches reflect distinctly the 
opposing X- and Y-theories of McGregor (1957). The 
X-theory is fuelled by a negative human expectancy 
and distrust and the Y-theory by positive human 
expectancy and trust. Most people prefer optimistic 
attitudes, as do we. However, the positive expectancy-
based stewardship theory is not per se a theory that 
ensures a more effective corporate governance.  The 
question is how to deal with human fallibility. In the 
body of agency literature managerial moral hazard is 
a prominent issue (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Walsh & 
Seward, 1990; Haid, 1997). In spite of all effort put in 
incentive compensation and monitoring, worldwide 
scandals show that the risk of managerial moral 
hazard has not been controlled (for instance Enron, 
the Banking Crisis and recently the Volkswagen 
Group). The detached attitude of boards in principal 
agency settings in regard of the actual behavior of the 
management, creates a moral void that provides 
ample occasion to opportunistic courses of action 
(Ghoshal, 2005; Dowd, 2009). Furthermore, leading 
agency scholars have questioned the effectiveness of 
boards (e.g. Jensen, 1993; Jensen, 2000), emphasizing 
that in comparison to complementary forces of state 
regulation, the capital and customer markets, boards 
exercise a weak disciplinary force.  
As far as our knowledge goes, stewardship 
scholars show no interest in misbehaviour, moral 
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hazard, fraud, excessive risk-taking36, and board 
failure in stewardship settings. Fama and Jensen, 
prominent principal agency scholars, have 
hypothesized that non-profits are subject to moral 
hazard issues too (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Gelman and 
Gibelman (2000; 2004) in their worldwide research of 
non-profit scandals find that founders and managing 
directors of these organizations are not forestalled by 
boards in their course to fraud, financial 
mismanagement, and other kinds of wrongdoing. The 
belief in the good intentions of the managers has been 
pervasive. We think that Gelman and Gibelman offer 
us a dark-sided view of stewardship governance that 
is beyond the scope of the theory. Stewardship is, in 
juxtaposition to agency theory, used as governance 
framework by researchers on finance and (forensic) 
accounting. For instance, Albrecht, Albrecht & 
Albrecht (2004) find that a stewardship approach in 
governance is more remedial to fraud, if the actual 
behavior of the senior managers is stewardship-like. 
On the other hand, self-identified stewardship has no 
remedial effect. In organizations with perception of 
fairness (Schrijver, Delbeke, Maesschalck, & Pleysier, 
2010) fraud and others kinds of misbehaviour are less 
likely to happen than in organizations led by selfish 
managers (American Institutue of Certifed Public 
Accountants, 2002). So, stewardship offers 
advantageous prospects in governance, as long as 
actual behavior is observable and in line with the 
intentions connected to stewardship. Without this 
added condition, stewardship theory shows both in 
theory as in practice a behavioural void too, namely 
blind trust. Blind trust is stated as an ineffective 
phenomenon of trust (Luhmann, 1973). In his early 
treatise Luhmann infers that trust requires 
commitment of the governors to react on breaches of 
trust by managers, and includes the willingness of the 
trustor to switch to a crisis management role when 
needed37. According to Luhmann the autonomy of the 
trustee cannot be unconditional. This extension to the 
theory of trust is lacking in the conceptualization of 
stewardship theory as governance framework. 
In the conceptual elaboration of both 
frameworks the power relation between board and 
senior management have to be taken into account 
(Murray, Bradshaw, & Wolpin, 1992; Cornforth, 1999). 
Agency theory assumes board dominance, which is 
limited by information asymmetry. Stewardship 
theory provides autonomy to the senior management. 
As autonomy means literally the faculty to state your 
own rules, stewardship theory appears to be affiliated 
to the managerial hegemony theory (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). Information asymmetry is not 
reducing the power distance; on the contrary, the 
balance scales up towards to the steward due to the 
abstinence of monitoring or to the negligence about 
information sharing38 by the steward’s board. Set up 
in their autonomous realm, stewards do not have to 
face countervailing powers and negative feedback 
unless invoked and maintained by themselves. On the 
one hand the deep-rooted belief in human fallibility 
of the agency theory may have been criticized as 
being self-fulfilling (Ghoshal, 2005), on the other 
hand governance conducted by stewardship theory 
takes a risk on leadership derailment too. There 
happens to be no defense against stewards who 
                                                          
36 Muth & Donaldson mention an age depending risk-appetite of senior 
managers  (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
37 These steps are discerned by Mordaunt and Cornforth in their research on 
non-profit boards (2004). 
develop a belief in their own infallibility and divine 
power, due to a conducive environment (Padilla, 
Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007) or by ‘grace’ of their high-
pitched traits.    
 Both agency theory as stewardship theory fail 
to provide a complete framework for effective 
governance. Cornforth states that neither agency nor 
managerial hegemony theory is able to explain 
complex power relations as observed in practice 
(Cornforth, 1999). A mixture (Van Slyke, 2007) and an 
alternation (Van Slyke, 2005) of elements of agency 
and stewardship theory were recommendable. Both 
agency and stewardship theory are reductionalist and 
normative approaches which do not give clues on how 
to deal with contextual factors (Van Slyke, 2007; 
Cornforth, 2012). In an evaluation of the research on 
the governance of public and non-profit 
organizations Cornforth contends that research has 
focused too narrowly on the boards of unitary 
organizations, and has ignored both the wider 
governance system and the more complex multi-level 
and multi-faceted governance structures that many 
organizations in sectors have adopted (Cornforth, 
2012, p. 2). According to Cornforth board processes 
are in the long run influenced by historical and 
contextual factors.   
 
1.2. A corporate governance context: the sector of 
Dutch semi-public housing management 
 
We have chosen a specific context for the research on 
corporate governance, namely the Dutch public 
housing sector. The sector comprises 376 decision-
making units39. The organizations are examples of 
non-profit organizations embedded in public law and 
policy. In The Netherlands the execution of public 
services like health care, social welfare, education, 
and housing is assigned to private legal entities 
without shareholders and owners. The Dutch housing 
corporations have the legal entity regime of 
corporation (vast majority) and association and are 
obliged by the state to maintain a non-distribution 
constraint. Since the early nineties the state control is 
diminished through a policy reform. The reform 
aimed at more autonomy for housing corporations. 
Key issues of the reform were the promotion of 
entrepreneurship and of corporate governance. The 
sector can be marked as an early example of New 
Public Management (Hood, 1991). Within Dutch 
public service it was a frontier sector with regards to 
corporate governance. Corporate governance was 
seen as a way to professionalize and step away from 
the traces of voluntarism. Therefore, the corporation 
status was promoted above the association. In the 
design of the corporate governance a two-tier board 
was preferred, departing from the board of directors 
as is usual in Anglo-Saxon countries. There is a (non-
executive) board of governors, which chooses its own 
chair. The board is independent from the senior 
management. The senior management has the 
discretion to exert the property rights, within the 
boundaries of board approval. There is no distinct 
owner of the organization’s assets/resources. The 
board of governors acts autonomously and is not 
subordinated to a body to which it has to account for 
38 Information sharing is proposed as a strategy in response to moral hazard 
(Millon & Thakor, 1985). 
39 At the end of 2013. Ultimo 2001 there were 579 housing corporations 
(Statistics provided by the CFV). 
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its decisions and policy; there are no actors who can 
enforce a turnover of the board. So the position of the 
boards is indistinct as well. 
The introduction of the corporate governance 
model has been a process of mimetic isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Actors had their own 
motives to promote this market-like corporate 
governance model. The Dutch state wanted a 
professionalization of the sector, while the sector 
organization regarded the corporate governance 
model as an alternative and buffer to state control. 
So, corporate governance got vaguely associated with 
self-regulation and autonomy, while the 
configuration was not properly thought trough. Later 
on, problems rose related to the indistinctnesses in 
the configuration. 
A key event in the mid nineties was a conversion 
of the state subsidization and financing to lump sum 
deposits, calculated in schemes with determined 
macro-economic parameters. The housing 
corporations benefitted from advantageous macro-
economic parameters, a situation which caused a cash 
windfall. During that time the investments in public 
housing were limited and a number of housing 
corporations started commercial real estate 
development. The first debacles happened: cases 
emerged of real estate fraud and a financial debacle 
with derivatives, in which 15 corporations were 
involved (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2014). 
The Dutch government reacted with an 
administrative obligation to the housing corporations 
to have a document with articles on investment and 
finance. There were no reconsiderations with regard 
to the corporate governance configuration. 
In 2004 a sector wide plan for incentive 
compensation (Comissie-Izeboud, 2004) was 
introduced by Aedes, the sector organization. The 
plan reflected the practice at opinion leading 
corporations. The CEO-compensation was related to 
the size of the firms and to market-leadership. The 
last criterion implied the reputation of the 
corporations concerning innovation and 
entrepreneurship. A bonus plan was related to the 
real estate investment sum. The level of emoluments 
was related to the reference group of directors in the 
commercial market, not to the level of compensation 
in other non-profit sectors. There were no 
considerations reported in respect of moral hazard. 
The compensation plan facilitated compensation-
based mergers and reputation-boosting investment 
programs (Koolma, 2008). The senior management 
was clearly treated as agents. The second part of the 
principal agency set up, the monitoring by the board 
did not get equal attention. The approval and 
accounting procedures for acquisition and real estate 
performance were superficial in comparison to the 
commercial market. At the same time the financial 
authority indicated in a research on the self-perceived 
role of board members, that the boards regarded the 
senior managers as stewards (CFV, 2003). The 
financial authority expressed serious concerns about 
the quality of board performance on behavioural 
control, risk-assessment, integrity and accountability, 
concerns that persisted in following inquiries (CFV, 
2005; CFV, 2006; CFV, 2011; CFV, 2011). The 
observations suggest that boards acted from a 
stewardship perspective, leaving the major decisions 
to the autonomy of the senior management. With 
regard to integrity issues and risk-taking. Boards 
appeared to have blind trust in the senior 
management. The concerns and warnings of the 
financial authority (CFV) were neglected by the 
political superiors, the subsequent state secretaries 
and ministers. The CFV did not have the faculty and 
authority to correct the boards and to intervene into 
the corporate governance of the housing 
corporations. The CFV sought an alliance with a 
national association of board members (VTW), which 
was founded in 2002. However, this actor did not 
have either the power or formal authority to 
intervene.  
During the same period the state delegates 
addressed the senior management ambiguously. In 
conferences the senior managers were evoked to act 
like real entrepreneurs, to seek risks and to ‘show 
guts’ (Minister van VROM, 2003). Emerging losses on 
development of commercial housing in urban areas 
had to be solved creatively with consent of the 
minister. Necessary renewal of the legislation on the 
governance of housing corporations was suspended 
because the minister came to an agreement with the 
sector organization. Cooperation in a state policy 
program was exchanged for an ongoing practice of 
self-regulation (Interrogations, 2014). 
 Senior managers were treated like agents 
without any awareness whatsoever of entailed moral 
hazard. While being the political principal (Koolma, 
2013), the interrogations of state representatives at 
the parliamentary inquiries show a general disregard 
of monitoring tasks. Senior officials rationalized why 
the state could not execute the tasks. The department 
lacked oversight, internal boards had that function 
and on merger decisions clients and municipalities 
were the stakeholders (Interrogations, 2014). 
Meanwhile, the department issued evaluations, some 
so praiseful that internal boards did not dare to have 
a different opinion on the performance of their senior 
managers. In spite of their responsibility, board 
members reported during the interrogations that they 
trusted the department and financial authority so 
much that they did not feel the need to formulate own 
appraisals. 
Afore a parliamentary inquiry is mentioned. 
After an ongoing sequence of scandals revealed in 
public media the Dutch parliament decided to 
investigate the sector and its senior managers 
(Esmeijer, 2013). The three major cases are concisely 
discussed.  
1) The chair executive of Rochdale, a 
corporation in the Amsterdam region, has been 
prosecuted for real estate fraud, which caused losses 
amounting to at least 6 million euro. In 2004 a first 
report was given to the department of alleged 
integrity violation. Not until the report in the public 
media at the end of 2008 the chairman was exempted 
from interventions by his board and the state 
department. The board did not accomplish to set up 
a monitoring of the real estate projects in spite of 
feelings of unsoundness. A lie about driving his 
exuberant company car, a Maserati Quattroporte, 
facilitated the board in her decision to fire the 
manager. The board resigned after political pressure 
and a full-page report about their personal data in the 
main financial daily of The Netherlands. The reason 
why the department had renounced an intervention is 
not reported (Rijksauditdienst, 2009; Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal, 2014) and is still unrevealed. 
During the interrogation the manager showed no 
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regret, contended to have served the cause of social 
housing, and said only to have made some mistakes. 
Hereby he showed a self-identified stewardship 
adverse of his actual behavior. 
2) In 2004 Woonbron, a corporation in the 
Rotterdam region decides to buy a former cruise ship 
from the municipality. The business case is approved 
by the department before the internal board has had 
its say. Costs are underestimated by ten times just 
like the revenues are overestimated. At the same rate 
the restoration of the ship did not have a substantial 
relation to housing. In 2009 the board resigns after 
fierce debates in the parliament and negative reports 
in the media. The chairman of the senior management 
resigns some months later. When Woonbron succeeds 
to sell the ship to a hospitability entrepreneur the 
final result sums up to a loss of 230 million euro. The 
board has been critical on the project but has 
accepted a goal displacement and a budgetary camel 
nose. The former chairman is entrapped and 
entrenched in a personal pet project. The project is 
also an example of excessive risk-taking and financial 
mismanagement with continuing financial 
restatements. During the interrogation the chairman 
has expressed regret for the losses and the damage to 
sector’s reputation. In his opinion, the intentions to 
save the southern district of Rotterdam from 
deprivation were good. In this case to a self-identified 
steward gave his statements. Similar is the 
disturbance of the corporate governance by state 
representatives, who were euphoric about the project 
even when it turned out to be a fiasco. 
3) The final case concerns the derivatives 
debacle and fraud at Vestia, the largest  corporation 
with almost 90.000 houses all over The Netherlands. 
In 2012 the corporation appears to have a derivatives 
portfolio of 23 billion euro. The treasurer and the 
senior manager of Vestia have set up an alleged profit 
centre for derivatives trade. Annual reports show an 
advantage on the interest rate on long-term loans of 
1% less than the next best corporation. The annual 
reports are not explicit on the size of liquidity risks 
involved. Clauses in the contracts with the business 
banks force Vestia to deposit to such an amount that 
a default is near and a backstop by the government 
would cause a degradation of the international rating 
of the Dutch state. A direct intervention is not 
feasible because of breaking event clauses in the 
contracts. An arrangement is made for a bail-out. The 
losses amount to 3 billion euro, which are taken by 
Vestia and the collective of the sector. The senior 
manager is fired. The board resigns under severe 
pressure of the state department. The state 
department has reported laudatory on the 
performance of Vestia. Vestia was the corporation 
that by means of takeovers solved financial problems 
of other failing corporations. The risks in the policy 
of Vestia have been neglected by the internal board, 
accountants, the financial authority (CFV), the sector 
intermediary to the capital market (WSW) and the 
department officials. In the interrogation the senior 
manager avoided to express regret. He stated to have 
served the cause of the social housing well. The losses 
were needlessly caused by the intervention of the 
state. The board accepted to be off side of the 
financial policy of Vestia. They said to have had great 
                                                          
40 All three senior managers were welcomed as saviors: Rochdale saved a high-
rise district in Amsterdam, Woonbron would save southern Rotterdam from 
deprivation and Vestia averted defaults of weak corporations.  
confidence in the capacities of the senior manager 
and his staff. This reputation was eagerly supported 
by state officials and the sector agencies. One last 
remark is that the senior manager of Vestia received 
a bonus plan from his board aimed at an offensive 
acquisition strategy. 
The historical draw and the discussion of the 3 
cases show an unsynchronized, contradictory and 
even a toxic mixture of stewardship identification and 
actual uncontrolled agent behavior, causing new 
schoolbook examples of decision failure and moral 
hazard. The interference between the principal layers 
in the governance network has created circumstances 
in which the drift to failure was not interrupted 
(Koolma, 2013).  
The impact of the failures was an institutional 
crisis that constitutes the starting point for the 
empirical research in next session. The lack of 
involvement of the internal boards has been 
remarkable. The power relations in the three cases 
indicate managerial hegemony and irresponsive 
boards, which are overjumped by the senior 
managers as were they insignificant and irrelevant. 
The managers decided on the resources as if they 
were the sole owners of these non-profit 
corporations, providing evidence of moral hazard 
hypothesis of Fama and Jensen (1983).  An 
explanation is that the boards had the task to 
supervise senior managers whose reputations40 were 
outstanding and beyond doubt of higher authorities. 
Their trust appeared to be not justified in hindsight. 
Such read the statements of board members during 
the interrogations. An alternative explanation might 
be that the governors have followed a course that 
served their self-interest. Intervention would explode 
their workload and launch the risk of a loss of face 
when their reputation should contest the one of the 
senior manager.  
The enforcement of the law and subordinate 
regulations has been neglected in the discussed cases 
and also in other cases of the parliamentary inquiry. 
There was a general preference for self-regulation by 
the housing corporations. While having a protective 
intermediary to the capital market and ruling a 
monopoly in the market for affordable housing with 
entry barriers (Koolma, 2008), all correcting force was 
depending on the boards of governors of the housing 
corporations. In almost all cases the boards have 
proved to be ineffective. 
The government’s reaction was to blame mainly 
the managers and boards of housing corporations. 
State control is restored. The minister decides in an 
overruling way the hiring, incentive compensation, 
monitoring, and firing of internal board members and 
senior managers41. New regulation is restricting the 
autonomy of housing corporations in their operations 
in a comprehensive and detailed way. Boards 
reconsider their position in relation to the senior 
management. Prior to the research, we expected to 
find a control reflex of the boards at the expense of 
senior managers who have done no wrong and have 




41 In imitation of the Dutch Central Bank ‘fit and proper test’ are conducted  by 
the new housing authority. 
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1.3. Main questions in empirical research  
 
Starting in a situation in which there seems a general 
agreement that the corporate governance has been 
ineffective in the past, looks like an easy way to 
conclusions. However the positions and interests of 
actors differ. The role perception of boards and 
management are probably changed. In this context we 
have raised the following research questions: 
 What are the role perceptions and 
governance opinions of boards and senior managers 
in the context of the institutional crisis in the Dutch 
semi-public housing sector? 
 What are the implications for the 
interaction between board and senior management? 
 Which opinions are traceable to the 
components of the governance frameworks in the 
literature? 
Besides the principal agency and stewardship 
theory a third additional framework is proposed, 
namely a trust-based, a mutual or reciprocaly one in 
which the simplicity of one-sided dominance (either 
board or managerial) is breached. Both agency theory 
and stewardship theory are taken in the original form, 
neglecting some recent nuances and amendments in 
the literature. This choice might be judged as 
arbitrary, but we have made this choice with the ideal 
typing of Weber in mind. Trust-based governance 
resembles stewardship theory, but the notion of trust 
is departing fundamentally from the original 
stewardship theory. Arbitrary in the stewardship 
theory is the assumption that best results are 
achieved when the steward has maximized autonomy 
and the board keeps distance. The boards are 
important when the intrinsic motivation of the 
candidate steward is assessed (Mills & Keast, 2009; 
Mills & Keast, 2013). Both theories fail to take into 
account the context and the development of the 
relation over time (Van Slyke, 2007). The literature on 
trust (Luhmann, 1973; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) 
provides leads to a third framework. 
 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS, AND 
OPERATIONALIZATION 
 
In order to find a new avenue to effective governance, 
an explorative research design is drawn: 
 




The first two research questions are answered 
by means of a two stage empirical inquiry. The first 
stage comprises 14 interviews with key role players 
regarding the governance in the Dutch semi-public 
housing sector. The informants are selected on 
having a wide view on governance affairs in the 
sector. Most of them have occupied diverse positions 
in the institutional network and have practical 
governance experience. A wide range of the 
institutional network has been covered: an 
opinion-leading accountant, a former alderman, a 
former minister, directors from the former (CFV) and 
new housing authority, the director of the 
intermediary to the capital market (WSW), a former 
chairman of one of the two sector banks, the 
chairman of the sector organization, the chairman of 
the pressure group of tenants, the managing director 
of the association of board members, a former state 
advisor and a scientist.  
All informants consented to be interviewed. The 
interviewer was already acquainted with 12 of the 14 
interviewees. The interviews are conducted through a 
technique whereby only one question at the start of 
the interview is raised. The question reads: “What are 
the characteristics of effective governance and in 
what respect does the interaction between board and 
senior management contribute to effective 
governance”. By ‘humming’ the interviewees are 
stimulated to continue their monologues. Most 
interviewees spoke about 47 minutes continuously. 
The interviews provided data for a discourse analysis. 
The exact interview transcripts have been scanned for 
salient statements, input for the second stage of the 
empirical inquiry. 
The second stage is conducted by means of Q-
methodology, a survey technique driven by factor 
analysis (Exel & Graaf, 2005). The software is 
developed as PQMethod application by Peter 
Schmolck (http://schmolck.org/qmethod). 45 
statements have been selected which have to be 
sorted in a 7 point Likert-like scale; from totally 
disagree to totally agree. The technique forces people 
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to rank and choose, and is especially suited for the 
measurement of values, preferences and opinions. 
The first step in the factor analysis is made by 
Principal Component Analysis. All statements remain 
in the model. Rotation is not made by hand but 
automated by Varimax. The factor analysis has been 
set up to report on three factors. Four factors resulted 
in a kind of fragmentation due to the relative small 
number of respondents. The statements discriminate 
at confidence intervals 0 > 0.01 and 0.01 > 0.05.   
 Board members and senior managers have been 
invited to perform a Q-sort with the selected 
statements. 14 board members and 13 senior 
managers accepted the invitation. A pre-test is done 
in order to obtain a balance between dissenting end 
consenting statements. The response to online 
invitations was low (<30%) and only 3 of the sorts 
appeared to be performed correctly. The remainder 
was performed on a sheet with 45 cards like playing 
a board game. The informants were afterwards asked 
to give their comments on the test. Some reported 
feelings of ambiguity at certain statements. Each sort 
started with a free-ordering instruction, in order to 
measure an eventual off-set to an average consensus 
or dissent. Generraly, there was a small off-set to 
consensus, departing from the balanced scores in the 
pre-tests.  At the interpretation of the scores on the 
statements the off-set is taken into account.  
As discussed before, three governance 
frameworks are assumed. We did not expect that the 
sorts of statements by the respondents would reflect 
exactly distinct frameworks. In order to be able to 
trace the opinions to the frameworks, the frameworks 
have been operationalized in aspects or components 
of each framework. We are aware of the gross 
reduction made by the translation into indicators.  
In this research design the principal agency 
framework consist of: 
 Response on information asymmetry; 
 Extrinsic motivation and incentive 
compensation; 
 Scrutinized monitoring; 
 Attention to moral hazard. 
The stewardship frameworks has in our inquiry 
the next indicators: 
 The assumption that board and management 
continuously share goals; 
 Intrinsic motivation; 
 Autonomy of the management. 
The trust-based framework needs still some 
discussion in this paper.  
Inter-actor trust relies on the willingness to be 
vulnerable (Luhmann, 1973; Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995) when leaving a task to another. 
This willingness is based on positive expectancy of 
the intention of the other (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998). Departing from stewardship theory, 
we assume that the intentions not only are important 
at the start of a trust relation. Intentions have to be 
exchanged in one way or another during the 
continuation of the relation between trustor and 
trustee. Not only the intentions of the trustee are 
relevant, also the one of the trustor, namely the 
expectations. Therefore the first component is: 
 Exchange of intentions and expectations. 
Stewardship’s autonomy infers a distant role for 
the principal. Mills and Keast (2009; 2013) find 
contra-indications for this assumption. Stewards and 
their performance prosper when assured of the 
involvement and attention of the principal. This 
finding is convergent with Self-Determination Theory 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). Relatedness is a condition for 
effective autonomy. Trust has both a cognitive and an 
affective dimension (McAllister, 1995). Board 
members seems to keep distance in avoidance of 
affiliation and loss of independence. However, if all 
affect is banished out of the relation to the senior 
manager, trust will be fragile. It requires a search for 
balance (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). Not only 
personal involvement is required. Board members 
who show no interest in the cause and the purpose of 
the firm, transfer intentions of negligence and 
indifference to the senior management. 
 Hence, we propose the next component: 
 Involvement in the relation and in the cause 
and purpose of the firm. 
Trust has the advantage that the informational 
burden of contract specification and monitoring is 
alleviated (Brown, Potovski, & Van Slyke, 2007). This 
a core issue of trust (Luhmann, 1973; Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995). However, when the trustee is 
unwilling to openness of information exchange in 
respect to his of her autonomy, the trustor will have 
reasonable doubt about the benevolence and integrity 
of the trustee. Sharing of information might also be a 
solution to moral hazard issues (Millon & Thakor, 
1985), a solution without generating distrust and 
heavy monitoring. In the relation between board and 
senior management openness with regard to the 
exchange of information and opinions has to be a 
taken-for-granted. Therefore we propose the 
following component: 
 Openness with regard to the exchange of 
information and opinions. 
The trinity benevolence, ability and integrity are 
the backbone of trust. We assume that these 
conditions are required not only at the start of the 
relation. This seems obvious but we observe a 
reservation to this theme in governance situations. 
From these three concepts integrity is the one that 
has the least tolerance. Integrity violations breach and 
damage trust often irreparably. With this 
consideration we propose the next component: 
 Questionable integrity in the relation 
between board and senior management. 
Ability is also a main issue in the relation 
between trustor and trustee. However, managers of 
enterprises and other firms who have to adapt to 
their environment have to take decisions and start 
projects which are new to the organization, 
management and board. Without tolerance on ability, 
the senior management will become risk averse and 
will flight into an administrative task execution. So, 
managers have to learn on the job and need support 
of their boards. In this learning feedback is required. 
Two kinds of feedback are distinguished: affirmative 
feedback on goal attainment and feedback on errors 
and possible improvements (Ashford, Blatt, & 
VandeWalle, 2003). Avoidance of giving and accepting 
negative feedback is a source of entrapment and 
other kinds of decision failures (Koolma, 2013). 
However, feedback is easily taken as a personal attack 
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and ego-offense. Acceptance of feedback requires 
psychological effort (Hendry, 2005) and social 
intelligence. Boards and senior management have to 
create an interaction and atmosphere wherein 
negative feedback does not harm the relationship. So 
the next component is: 
 Interaction wherein feedback is given and 
accepted without resentment or animosity. 
The last component comprehends all previous 
components. The building and maintenance of a 
trust-based relation requires reciprocity in the 
interaction. For instance, a board can summon 
integrity, but has no authority if the integrity of board 
members themselves is arbitrary. Benevolence and 
ability cannot be unilateral requirements of the senior 
manager too. Board and management have to face 
each other in full respect. Exchange of information 
and opinions is prolific if the flow goes two-ways. 
Hence we state the final condition for a trust-based 
governance: 
 Reciprocity in the relation between board 
and management. 
The third framework assumes a mutual 
investment of the relation between board and senior 
management. The next components constitute the 
third framework: 
 Exchange of intentions and expectations. 
 Involvement in the relation and in the cause 
and purpose of the firm. 
 Openness with regard to the exchange of 
information and opinions. 
 Questionable integrity in the relation between 
board and senior management. 
 Interaction wherein feedback is given and 
accepted without resentment or animosity. 
 Reciprocity in the relation between board and 
management. 
The statements of the key-role players are 
crossed with the components of the three 
frameworks. In this matrix some statements relate to 
more than one component. When a component has 
more than one related statements, the scores on the 
statements are divided by the number of cells. Doing 
so, the components are weighed equally. 
3. RESULTS INQUIRY 
 
The results will be reported in two sections. The first 
one comprises the findings from the discourse 
analysis.  
3.1. Results Discourse Analysis 
 
14 key-role players in the governance of Dutch 
housing corporations are interviewed by asking one 
single question: “What are the characteristics of 
effective governance and in what respect does the 
interaction between board and senior management 
contribute to effective governance”. Their answers 
have been coded following the indicators or 
components of the three theoretical frameworks. In 
advance total coverage of the components was not 
guaranteed. Some informants will be familiar with 
                                                          
42 A notion related to the resource dependency approach in which the network 
of the non-executive boards members are considered as a resource. 
concepts from scientific governance literature. More 
likely is their frame of reference to be found in 
literature as discussed in local and national networks 
of governance and housing. No attempt has been 
made to trace the source of their statements. 
Surprisingly, the informants consent on most 
issues. There are some differences in emphasis and 
nuance. Because of this result, we have decided to 
suffice with a concise record of the discourse. 
 In Dutch inner governance circles there is a 
saying that reads “Don’t sit on the chair of the senior 
manager”. It is a mantra that reflects a norm, namely 
the board has to respect the autonomous position of 
the manager and ‘don’t try to do his or her work 
yourself’. This norm is no longer taken for granted. 
One is not surprised when board members gather 
information on their own initiative and bypass the 
senior manager. The informants observe contacts of 
boards with accountants, employees and 
stakeholders in absence of the senior management. 
Probably this is a reaction to the scandals where 
essential information has stayed outside the view of  
boards. It is their way to handle the problem of 
information asymmetry. There is little attention to 
and belief in positive effects of incentive 
compensation. Bonus plans are even seen as sources 
of adverse effects. Scrutinized monitoring is not 
popular. The monitoring is associated with a heavy 
accounting load for housing corporations in the 
period after the crisis. The informants show an 
aversion to ticking the boxes on checklists. The 
general opinion is that ‘common sense’ is more 
important in the assessment of the policy and the 
observation of the behavior of the senior manager. 
Moral hazards are not in the foreground of the 
responses.  
Intrinsic motivation is very much preferred. 
Intrinsic motivation has an unquestioned positive 
effect according to the informants. Sharing of goals is 
seen as a major issue, in the sense that boards ought 
to have a say in the formulation of goals. A trend is 
that board’s members are allowed to use their 
networks42. It would contribute to the results and the 
legitimacy of the housing corporations. One is aware 
of a risk of board member networking. It could easily 
evoke confusion about the question who is ‘in 
command’.  
The coverage of the components of the third 
framework is less convincing. An open relation 
between board and senior managers is noted 
frequently. It is necessary to have a relation in which 
feedback can be given. The idea of a two-way 
direction in the relation is less common. So, there is 
attention for the interaction between board and 
senior management and this supports the idea of 
open relationship. However, the idea is still in 
consideration and the implications are not clear yet. 
3.2. Results of Sorting Statements 
 
There has been made a selection of salient statements 
out of the transcripts of the interviews with the key-
role players in sector’s governance. The statements 
are not derived from the theoretical frameworks but 
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associate well and give a full coverage of the 
component of all three frameworks. Without 
connotation to the frameworks the statements are 
presented to a new group of respondents, comprising 
14 board members (G = governors) and 13 senior 
managers (M). There is a spread regarding the size 
and urbanization grade, but the small number does 
not allow to account for external validity. The 
respondents have been asked to sort the statements 
in a fixed score board with a seven point-scale. 
The correlation between the sorts in de sample 
equals to 0.32. Split in groups the correlation scores 
are 0.33 for the managers and 0.37 for the governors. 
The scores are high but not extreme regarding the 
select sample of professional peer group members. 
Notwithstanding the correlation level, discriminating 
three factors have been found. 
 
Table 1. Response categories Q sort of 45 statements 
 
Valuation Count of statements to place Score 
Full disagreement 4 -3 
Disagreement 6 -2 
Slight disagreement 8 -1 
Neutral 9 0 
Slight agreement 8 1 
Agreement 6 2 
Full agreement 4 3 
 
Table 2.  Factor loading of respondents’ factor loadings 
 
Informant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Highest loading 
M01 0.6011* 0.1979 0.2011 1 
M11 0.7237* 0.2703 0.1017 1 
M02 -0.0364 0.5518* 0.4929 2 
M03 0.3376 0.6003* 0.2982 2 
M04 0.0838 0.5303* 0.2499 2 
M05 0.0846 0.6783* 0.0432 2 
M09 0.3600 0.6393* 0.2449 2 
M10 0.1812 0.6699* 0.0318 2 
M12 -0.0099 0.7176* 0.2676 2 
M13 0.4256 0.4911* -0.1258 2 
M06 0.1655 0.4390 0.6244* 3 
M07 0.3644 0.2952 0.5324* 3 
M08 -0.0084 0.1649 0.5403* 3 
G01 0.6593* 0.3410 0.1557 1 
G05 0.8253* 0.0413 0.1036 1 
G06 0.4480* -0.0082 0.3531 1 
G09 0.5513* 0.2838 0.3097 1 
G12 0.7587* 0.1090 0.0564 1 
G13 0.7682* 0.0811 0.2465 1 
G14 0.6435* 0.2851 0.4961 1 
G04 0.1865 0.5748* -0.0202 2 
G03 0.4376 0.1850 0.6933* 3 
G07 0.0817 0.1091 0.6780* 3 
G08 0.4456 -0.0583 0.6427* 3 
G11 0.2876 -0.0248 0.6338* 3 
G02 0.3606 0.3351 0.2296 none 
G10 0.4300 0.2973 0.3949 none 
Var. expl. 43 21% 16% 15%  
 
A factor loading of 1.0000 would imply that the 
sort of a respondent is identical to a calculated factor. 
In the table the factor loadings of the managers and 
governors are discernable. With regard to this 
distinction it is remarkable that factor 1 comprises in 
majority governors (7 to 2) and factor 2 consists of a 
majority of managers (8 to 1). Factor 3 appears to be 
                                                          
43 Variance is explained by the aggregate to a level of 52%. 
a mixed group (3 managers and 4 governors). The 
factors have the next characteristics inferring the 
significantly discriminating statements (p<0.01): 
 Factor 1, the ‘governors’ factor’, shows 
disagreement with belief in extrinsic motivation (-
1.80 (The scores minimum and maximum 
arithmetically range from -3 to 3)) and with managers 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 1, Fall 2016 
 
113 
that in anticipation on leading opinions adjust their 
input in the board meetings (-1.85) or use coping 
strategies in order to avoid blame (-1.78). The board 
is seen as guard against manager’s self-interest (1.01). 
One agrees on the statement that the manager is 
responsible for the policy and the board monitors the 
outcome in hindsight (1.07). Even more agreement is 
on the statement that one should have heart for the 
cause (1.32). Most agreement is on the opinion is that 
a good board is a very close watcher who intervenes 
if necessary (1.43).  
 Factor 2, the managers’ factor disagrees 
with the statement the board regularly tests the 
credibility of the senior manager and, if okay, grants 
him or her unconditional trust for the period coming 
(-1.94). Opposite to factor 1 there is disagreement 
with the statement that a good board is a very close 
watcher who intervenes if necessary (-1.66). One 
disagrees on the idea of sharing responsibility with 
the board in case of wicked problems (-1.19). In factor 
2 there is agreement that scandals have changed the 
board’s surveillance (1.17). Remarkable is agreement 
on the positive role of a Works Counsel within the 
internal governance (1.41). Most agreement is a self-
reflective question “Have I told enough why I do 
things” (1.62). 
 Factor 3, the mixed group, disagrees on the 
statement that the manager is responsible for the 
policy and the board monitors in hindsight (-2.07).  
One doesn’t want to rely wholly on the financial 
monitoring by the accountant and the national 
supervisors (-1.52). Remarkable is the disagreement 
on the statement that the board withholds from 
personal involvement and prefers to hire a personal 
coach for the senior manager (-1.47). Agreement is on 
the statement that that board should have diverse 
capabilities including insight in operational processes 
of the housing corporation (1.33). Most agreement is 
on the opinion is that a good board is a very close 
watcher who intervenes if necessary (1.76). 
The statements are connected and pivoted by 
means of a matrix to the components of the 
governance frameworks. Weighing is applied in order 
to suppress the effect of over-measurement of some 
components. All statements are taken into account, 
because selection on significance would lead to 
unbalanced comparisons between the factors while 
most statements are significant in one and not 
significant in the others factors. Elimination on 
significance in all three factors would lead to a severe 
loss of information. 
As discussed afore, the statements and 
components may have n to m connections to each 
other. The factors are related to the governance 
frameworks in next table. 
 
Table 3. Factors pivoted to the governance frameworks 
 
Component Framework Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Information asymmetry PA 0,03 0,24 0,43 
Scrutinized monitoring PA 0,44 -0,20 0,29 
Extrinsic Motivation PA -1,32 -0,82 -1,15 
Moral hazard PA -0,85 -1,05 -0,37 
Sharing the goals S 0,75 0,01 0,23 
Autonomy S -0,03 -0,48 -0,90 
Intrinsic motivation S 0,98 1,01 0,72 
Intentions and expectation T 0,64 0,69 0,70 
Involvement T 0,28 0,27 0,29 
Openness relationship T 1,04 0,18 1,09 
Integrity T 0,46 0,21 0,47 
Feedback T 0,74 -0,04 0,30 
Reciprocity T 0,02 0,32 0,44 
 
Due to the addition of non-extreme and neutral 
scores the figures range closer around zero. The 
‘scores’ of factors on the framework components are 
discussed in two sections. In the first section the 
consensus between the factors is looked at. 
One point of consensus is the preference for 
intrinsic motivation and an objection to extrinsic 
motivation. The distance in score of both components 
is 2.30 at factor 2, however the differences are not 
big. Sharing intentions and expectations scores 
almost equally among three factors (0.64 0.69 0.70). 
Appreciation for involvement of the board of the 
business is equally distributed but not high (0.28 0.27 
0.29). 
There are also divergent scores, representing 
dissent between the factors, and so, between the 
governors’ group (1), the managers group (2) and the 
mixed group (3). Factor 3 shows the most attention to 
coping with the information asymmetry. The aversion 
to the subject of moral hazard is highest in factor 2 
and lowest in factor 3. Sharing of goals is neutral in 
factor 2 and positive in the two other factors. 
Autonomy scores neutral in type 1, and negative in 
factors 2 and 3 (-0.03 -0.48 -0.90). Regarding 
openness in the relation between board and 
management factor 1 and 3 have a high scores while 
factor 2 approximates zero. This is remarkable 
because it suggests that the subject of openness does 
not have importance in the group of the senior 
managers. Attention to integrity scores higher in 
factor 1 and 3 on the one hand and factor 2 in the 
other hand. Giving feedback has the highest score in 
factor 1 and even a slight negative score in factor 2. 
Type 1, representing the governors group, has a 
neutral score on reciprocity while factors 2 and 3 have 
modest positive scores (0.02 0.32 0.44). It could 
suggest that change of one-way relation is not 
considered in the governors group. The connection to 
the stewardship framework is contradictory: Intrinsic 
motivation is regarded positively while autonomy 
tends to a negative score. The experience with the 
scandals in the recent past is a probable explanation, 
reporting senior managers to state their own rules to 
the dupe of their organizations. 
Generally, the respondents do not adhere to the 
principal agency model. Most scores are at zero or 
below. Exceptions are the scrutinized monitoring of 
factor 1 and the active coping with information 
asymmetry in factor 3. The trust frameworks get 
moderate positive scores. The governors group and 
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the mixed group set the positive scores. Factor 2, the 
managers group has diverged with lower scores on 
openness of the relation, attention to integrity, and 
the exchange of feedback. In analysis of the 
statements there is dissent between the governors 
group and the managers group, suggesting a classical 
antagonism between the need for control and the 
need for autonomy. Trust as an alternative to this 
antagonism is not embraced by the managers group. 
The mixed group seems to bridge this antagonism. 
Not surprisingly regarding the mixed composition. 
This group is most of the three inclined to share in 
the relation. 
4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
In the introduction we raised the following research 
questions: 
 What are the role perceptions and 
governance opinions of boards and senior managers 
in the context of the institutional crisis in the Dutch 
semi-public housing sector? 
 What are the implications for the 
interaction between board and senior management? 
 Which opinions are traceable to the 
components of the governance frameworks in the 
literature? 
The analysis of the two classic frameworks, the 
principal agency and stewardship theory shows that 
both approaches are incomplete. Abstracting from 
context is a lacuna, although this is a common fault 
of general theories. More problematic is the 
categorical antagonism of power relations and the 
absence of interaction dynamics. At this last point 
both approaches show behavioral voids. In the 
principal agency managers get a free hand to pursue 
opportunities, while in the stewardship theory the 
managers are blindly believed to remain stewards till 
their resignation. More recent authors recommend a 
smart combination of both approaches, and a 
dynamic alternation. We have drawn a third 
framework on the foundations of the trust literature. 
In this framework the interaction dynamics are 
covered and by sharing information and reciprocity 
the deadlock of the conflicting power positions could 
be overcome. 
The historical introduction of the case of the 
Dutch semi-public housing management gives 
evidence that a mixture of the principal agency and 
stewardship approach in corporate governance 
practice can be contradictory and toxic. The managers 
are under influence of incentives that induce 
entrepreneurship and risk-taking, while the board 
respects the autonomy of the managers to a fatal 
extend. Former stewards transform in to 
uncontrolled agents under this mixed governance 
regime. One question is not raised, namely what the 
intrinsic motivation of housing corporation managers 
would be and do in acquisitions and commercial real-
estate projects. Further, the negative interference of 
the state as political principal in corporate 
governance affairs is remarkable. It is supports the 
recommendation to consider multi-layered and multi 
- faceted governance networks surrounding the 
classical corporate board-senior manager 
relationship.  
The empirical research is conducted is very 
special historical context. The sector and the housing 
corporations are in a phase of reconsideration after 
an institutional crisis. This context has obviously 
colored the findings on the research questions. Key-
role players in sector governance and a sample of 
board members and senior managers: the actors in 
this Dutch non-profit sector have little affinity to the 
principal agency components. With regard to the 
stewardship the actors consent in a contradiction; 
there is a general preference for intrinsic motivation 
and also a slightly varying doubt about the blessings 
of autonomy. There is a moderate positive adherence 
to the components of the trust framework as 
elaborated in this paper. The factor analysis does not 
divide the respondents along the demarcations of the 
frameworks. A group with a majority of governors 
and a mixed group show attention for some 
components of the principal agency framework and 
have a more positive attitude to components of the 
trust framework. The group with senior managers 
gives food for thought. The score of their 
discriminating statements shows that they have a 
negative attitude to involved boards, to autonomy 
and to openness of the relationship. It can be 
understood as a temporarily defensive reaction to the 
public blaming of housing corporation managers. 
In the discussion we start with the restrictions 
of the research. It has an explorative aim, and the 
evidence from the analyses provides not more than 
an indication of the explanatory potential of the 
approach. The discourse analysis is covering the 
institutional network of the corporate governance. 
The sample of the factor analysis (27 respondents) is 
much too small to have pretentions on external 
validity. However the findings are internally 
significant and clarifying. Both discourse analysis and 
factor analysis should be extended in time, sample 
and to other non-profit sectors. By using a Q set of 
statements resulting from a discourse analysis, the 
cultural gap between a sector corporate governance 
practice and theoretical concepts is bridged and it has 
the flexibility in application to other sectors and 
countries. However, selection of the statements, the 
calibration of the test scores, and the linking to the 
framework components need further elaboration in 
order to get more robustness than they have now. 
The findings that a mixed group consisting of 
board member and senior managers bridging the gap 
between power positions and classical frameworks is 
remarkable and promising. In search for a new 
effective approach of the corporate governance the 
respondents and researchers seem to have chosen a 
same way. 
There are some ideas emerged that might 
indicate avenues for future research. The Self-
Determination Theory could lead to a reconsideration 
of the stewardship theory. There is proof that the 
conception of autonomy is not effected as intended. 
Another point is the difference between self-
identification and actual behavior of senior managers 
in stewardship situations. Managers’ 
self-identification is a very risky base for assessment 
and evaluation by boards. We have the idea that there 
is a related risk. Self-identification is related to 
psychological concept locus of control. We have leads 
to assume that full reliance on intrinsic motivation 
and self-identification stimulates managers to follow 
the pattern drawn by Salancik and Meindl (1984): 
successes are attributed to the manager’s effort and 
excellence while failures are caused by others and 
circumstances. Along this way autonomy and 
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avoidance of responsibility meet surprisingly. Finally, 
we recommend strongly to extende the research to 
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